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Abstract 
 
The object of this paper is to complement theoretical ‘mobile penetration’ literature with 
empirical evidence in a dual manner: on the one hand, assess the income-redistributive effect of 
mobile phone penetration and; on the other hand, the instrumentality of good governance in this 
nexus. Main findings suggest an equalizing income-redistributive effect, with a higher 
magnitude in the presence of government quality instruments. It follows that, good governance 
is a necessary condition for a higher income-equalizing effect of mobile phone penetration. The 
empirical evidence which deviates from mainstream country-specific and microeconomic 
survey-based approaches is on 52 African countries. ‘Mobile phone’-oriented poverty reduction 
channels are also discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
Many lives have been transformed by the mobile revolution, which is providing not just 
communication but also basic financial access in the forms of phone-based money transfer and 
storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). The significant growth 
and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into pocket-banks in 
Africa, is providing countries on the continent with increase cost-effective and affordable 
means of bringing on board a large part of the population that hitherto has been excluded from 
formal financial services for decades. At the 2007 ‘Connect Africa’ summit, the president of 
Rwanda Paul Kagame emphasized: “in ten short years, what was once an object of luxury and 
privilege, the mobile phone has become a basic necessity in Africa” (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 208). 
An article in The Economist (2008) backs this claim: “a device that was a yuppie toy not so 
long ago has now become a potent for economic development in the world’s poorest 
countries”. The purpose of this paper is to examine how these sentiments and slogans are 
reflected in the incidence of ‘mobile phone penetration’ on income-redistribution in Africa. The 
assessment is of significant interest not only to banks and Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) 
but also to governments, financial regulators as well as development partners who are 
providing the much needed support to improve the livelihoods of Africans through poverty 
reduction and sustained economic growth.  
Beside the need to examine these sentiments, two imperatives add substance to the 
motivation of this work: a missing link in the literature and the growing concern over the 
quality of institutions in the African continent. Firstly, there is an increasing body of work 
pointing to the imperative of more scholarly research on the phenomenon of mobile 
penetration
2
. As far as we know, one of the most exhaustive accounts on the ‘mobile 
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 “Relative to the spread of some other technologies that have been introduced in sub-Saharan Africa-improved 
seeds, solar cook stoves and agricultural technology-mobile phones adoption has occurred at a staggering rate on 
the continent. Yet few empirical economic studies have examined mobile phone adoption. This could be due to a 
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penetration’ development literature concludes: “Existing empirical evidence on the effect of 
mobile phone coverage and services suggests that the mobile phone can potentially serve as a 
tool for economic development in Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging 
remains limited. First, while economic studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones for 
particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated into 
macroeconomic gains…” (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 224). More so, as sustained by Maurer (2008) 
and supported in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012), 
scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of m-banking (payments) 
systems in the developing world is scarce. Majority of studies on mobile penetration have been 
theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; 
Thacker & Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical works are based on country-specific and 
micro-level data mostly collected from surveys (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). Secondly, an 
extensive literature on intuitions and development suggest that Africa is poor because it has 
poor institutions (Easterly, 2005; Asongu, 2013a,b). Hence, the need to examine what role 
institutions play in the incidence of mobile penetration on poverty.  
The contribution of this paper to the literature is therefore threefold. Firstly, it 
complements theoretical literature with empirical evidence on the income-redistributive effect 
of mobile phone penetration. As far as we know, macroeconomic evidence on the poverty 
incidence of mobile penetration is missing in the literature. Secondly, the study integrates the 
instrumentality of institutions in the mobile-inequality nexus to assess what role institutions 
plays, in order to give policy makers the much needed guidance in light of the current debate 
over institutions and poverty in Africa. Thirdly, contrary to mainstream literature that is 
focused on country-specific analyses, this paper covers 52 African countries. The choice of 
Africa as an investigation platform draws from the stubbornly high poverty rate and growing 
                                                                                                                                                           
variety of factors, including unreliable or nonexistent data on individual level adoption (leading to measurement 
error)…” Aker & Mbiti (2010, 225). 
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inequality in the continent (Asongu, 2013c,d). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Data and methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 2. Empirical analysis 
is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
We examine a sample of 52 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World 
Bank (WB). The ‘mobile phone penetration’ rate is obtained from the African Development 
Bank (AfDB). This rate could also account for mobile banking/activities (Ondiege, 2010; Aker 
& Mbiti, 2010; Asongu, 2013e). Owing to constraints in the time series properties of the mobile 
penetration measurement, the data structure is cross-sectional and consists of 2003-2009 
average growth rates. The measure for inequality is the GINI coefficient which accounts for 
income disparity among values of the frequency distribution. A value of zero denotes equality 
whereas, a coefficient of one expresses maximal inequality. The GINI index has been used in 
recent African inequality literature (Batuo et al., 2010; Asongu, 2013f), as well as in many 
disciplines investigating inequality (sociology, economics, health science, agriculture…etc).  
In the regressions, we shall control for the macroeconomic environment (inflation,  
financial depth), and government expenditure. The limitation to only three control variables is 
due to constraints in the Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity
3
. The 
following discussion is relevant to expected signs of the control variables in relation to 
inequality. We expect: high inflation to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) whereas low inflation 
should reduce it (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004); financial depth decreases uneven income 
distribution (Kai & Hamori, 2009); the impact of government expenditure depends on the 
                                                 
3
 An OIR test is only employable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher 
than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition not possible. 
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quality of institutions, especially if budget allocated for poverty reduction investments is not 
tainted with corrupt practices (Ndikumana & Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008).  
In this paragraph, we devote space to providing justification for the choice and intuitive 
basis of the instrumental variables. This justification is essential for the relevance of the 
empirical analysis because a theoretical basis for the instruments is imperative for sound and 
consistent interpretation of estimated coefficients. In other words, while the object of this 
article is to assess the effect of mobile penetration on inequality, it also indirectly aims to 
examine how government institutions are instrumental in the nexus.  Therefore, we investigate 
how three main aspects of how governance plays-out in the mobile-inequality nexus: (1) the 
process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (political governance: voice & 
accountability and political stability); the manner in which governments formulate, implement 
policies as well as deliver services (economic governance: regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness) and; the respect of citizens and state institutions that govern interactions among 
them (intuitional governance: rule of law and corruption control). Hence, instruments for the 
quality of formal institutions include: the rule of law, regulation quality, corruption-control, 
government effectiveness, political stability (no violence) and voice & accountability.  
Details about the variables’ sources, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
(showing the basic correlations between key variables employed in this paper) are presented in 
the appendices.  The summary statistics (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the cross-
sectional regressions reveal that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized such 
that one should be reasonably confident that estimated relationships should emerge. Definitions 
and corresponding sources of the variables are reported in Appendix 3. The interest of the 
correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to manage issues resulting from overparametization and 
multicolinearity.  Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not seem to be any serious 
concerns with respect to the relationships to be modeled.  
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2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Owing  to the cross-sectional structure of our data, we follow an empirical specification 
employed in the inequality literature for this type of data structure (Andrés,  2006). The model 
to be estimated is as follows:  
 
  InflationGovMMobileInequality 43210 2                    (1) 
where, Inequality denotes the GINI coefficient,  Mobile is the mobile phone penetration rate, 
Inflation is  the inflation rate, M2 stands for financial depth, Gov represents government 
expenditure and,   is the error term. Robustness of the analysis will be ensured with: (1) use of 
alternative specifications; (2) modeling with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) standard errors and; (3) RAMSEY’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test 
(RESET) for validity of model specification. Since we are modeling with Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), the four basic concerns of this approach are tackled. While, autocorrelation in 
the residuals and heteroscedasticity are tackled with HAC standard errors, the assumption of 
linearity is verified with RAMSEY’s RESET. As we have already highlighted above, the 
correlation analysis in Appendix 2 has helped us to avoid issues of multicolinearity and 
overparametization.  
 
2.2.2 Instrumental Variable estimation  
Given the research questions under consideration, OLS only provide a baseline of the 
mobile-inequality nexus. Corresponding estimates have to be compared with models that 
instrument the nexus with government quality indicators. To this effect, in accordance with  
recent inequality literature (Asongu, 2013d), the paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique. IV estimation solves the puzzle of 
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endogeneity and hence, avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by OLS when the 
exogenous variables are endogenous (correlated with the error term in the main equation).  
The  2SLS estimation will entail the following steps: 
 
First-stage regression:  
 ii sInstrumentMobile )(10  iX2 i                                        (2)             
Second-stage regression: 
 ii MobileInequality )(10  iX2  i                                  (3)                                                                                     
In the first and second equations, i   and i  respectively denote the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are: control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice & 
accountability, rule of law, regulation quality and political stability. X representing control 
variables entail: financial depth, inflation and government expenditure. Inequality is the GINI 
coefficient.  
We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an 
OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments 
are exogenous to the endogenous components of the main explaining variable (Mobile channel) 
and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main 
equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.  Further robustness checks are 
ensured with alternative specifications and modeling with robust HAC standard errors. 
 
3. Empirical results  
This empirical section addresses four main issues: (1) the ability of ‘mobile phone 
penetration’ to explain income-inequality conditional on other covariates (control variables);  
(2) the possibility of non-linear combinations of the fitted values explaining the response 
variable; (3) the ability of formal institutions to explain inequality beyond the mobile channel 
and; (4) the instrumentality to formal institutions in the inequality-mobile nexus. The first issue 
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is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients in the left hand side of the 
table, the second depends on the result of RAMSEY’s RESET, the third is contingent on the 
outcome of the Sargan OIR test while, the fourth concern depends on the three preceding 
issues. The intuition behind the RESET is that, if non-linear combinations of the exogenous 
variables have any power in explaining the response variable, then the model is misspecified. 
Therefore, the RESET is a general specification test for the linear regression model. The null 
hypothesis of this test is the stance that, non-linear combinations of the fitted values have no 
explanatory power on income-inequality. Hence, failure to reject the null hypothesis lends 
credit to the linear model specification. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position 
that instruments are valid in explaining inequality through no other mechanisms beside the 
mobile channel (conditional on the control variables). Thus, a rejection of the null hypothesis 
implies the instruments suffer from endogeneity as they are correlated with the error term in 
Eq. (3).   The Hausman test precedes every IV estimation technique. Its null hypothesis is the 
stance that, OLS estimates are efficient and consistent. Hence, the rejection of the null 
hypothesis points to the inconsistency of OLS owing to endogeneity and lends  credit to the 
choice of the 2SLS estimation strategy as means of assessing the instrumentality of formal 
institutions in the inequality-mobile nexus.  
Table 1 reports regressions of inequality on the ‘mobile phone penetration’ (mobile) 
channel. While the first half of the table reports OLS results, the second entails corresponding 
2SLS values.  As concerns the first issue, mobile penetration has a positive income 
redistributive effect. On the second issue, while Models 1-2 do not validate the linearity 
assumption, Model 3 is rightly linearly specified.  For the third issue, since the null hypotheses 
of the Sargan OIR are not overwhelmingly rejected, government quality instruments do not 
explain inequality beyond the mobile phone channel conditional on other covariates (control 
variables). To address the fourth issue, OLS specifications provide a baseline and we compare 
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their corresponding estimates with those of 2SLS. The resulting conclusion is that, formal 
institutions are instrumental in the positive income redistributive effect of mobile phone 
penetration. This is because, in the absence of good governance instruments (OLS 
specifications), the corresponding magnitudes of the mobile-inequality nexus are lower. The 
significant control variable has the right sign. High inflation (above 117% in the mean from 
Appendix 1) fuels inequality, in line with Albanesi (2007).  
 
Table 1: Effect of mobile banking on inequality (with HAC standard errors) 
 Dependent Variable: GINI Index 
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  1* Model  2* Model  3* 
Constant  83.924*** 84.365*** 95.127*** 136.91*** 129.037*** 137.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile penetration  -23.558*** -24.791** -32.743*** -53.840*** -49.488*** -56.840*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Financial depth  -5.045 -3.108 -10.426 -11.965 -14.457 -23.227 
 (0.441) (0.692) (0.164) (0.237) (0.261) (0.159) 
Gov’t  Expenditure  --- 0.107 -0.055 --- 0.203 0.074 
  (0.571) (0.754)  (0.718) (0.899) 
Inflation   --- --- 0.851** --- --- 1.161 
   (0.014)   (0.228) 
       
RAMSEY RESET 5.723*** 5.284** 1.298 --- --- --- 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.306)    
Hausman   --- --- --- 6.023** 5.333 9.164* 
    (0.049) (0.148) (0.057) 
Sargan OIR  --- --- --- 3.556 2.168 0.754 
    (0.469) (0.538) (0.685) 
Adjusted R² 0.268 0.281 0.465 0.275 0.257 0.422 
Fisher  4.167** 2.615* 4.462** 5.972*** 3.783** 5.733*** 
Observations  52 52 52 52 52 52 
Instruments  Not Applicable Government Quality Indicators 
       
  *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent.  P-values in 
brackets. Gov’t: Government. RESET: Regression Equation Specification Error Test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions Test. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 The object of this paper has been to complement theoretical mobile penetration 
literature with empirical evidence in a dual manner: on the one hand we have assessed the 
income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration and; on the other hand, the 
instrumentality of good governance in the nexus. Main findings suggest an equalizing income-
redistributive effect, with a higher magnitude in the presence of government quality 
instruments. It follows that good governance is a necessary condition for a higher income-
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equalizing effect of mobile phone penetration. It is worthwhile to point-out that, mobile phones 
represent long-term economic growth investments for the disadvantaged in income-distribution. 
Therefore, many households maybe willing to cope with unpleasant sacrifices (such as 
reduction in food consumption or sanitation in the perceived short-term) in the hope that the 
mobile phone would improve their opportunities with income and jobs in the long-term. Our 
findings have shown that these hopes and aspirations resulting from the use of mobile phones 
are more perceptible when formal institutions are strong. 
 The appealing income-redistributive effect of mobile banking could be explained from 
several perspectives. Firstly, mobile phones can assist households’ budget when faced with 
unpredictable shocks which drive poverty. The probability of a poor family incurring drastic 
loss due to an unpredictable shock is certainly mitigated and lowered when families are able to 
respond to the shock in a more timely fashion with the help of a mobile phone. Thus, the 
mobile phone could have the greatest effects on poverty reduction during vulnerable shock 
experiences through driving down costs associated to the shock. Better financial management 
and coping with shock include, among others: incurring lower travel costs, more efficient 
action, less trauma and improved access to information. Secondly, many lives have been 
transformed by the mobile revolution thanks to basic financial access in the form of phone-
based money transfer and storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). 
Therefore, the significant growth and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is transforming 
cell phones into pocket-banks in Africa is providing countries in the continent with increase 
affordable and cost-effective means of bringing on board a large part of the population that has 
until now been excluded from formal financial services for decades. Thirdly, mobile phones 
could empower women to run existing businesses more efficiently (or to engage in small 
businesses), thus enabling them to bridge the gap between gender income-inequality.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics, definitions and sources  
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
GINI Coefficient 43.100 7.702 29.760 65.770 52 
Mobile Penetration : Seven year average growth rate 
(% of population) 
1.674 0.217 1.043 2.242 52 
      
Control 
Variables  
Inflation (annual % of CPI) 117.95 764.60 1.953 5304.8 52 
Financial Depth (M2) 0.339 0.242 0.079 1.022 52 
Government  Expenditure (% of GDP)  11.015 12.229 0.0549 65.461 52 
       
 
 
Instrumental  
Variables  
Rule of Law (Estimate) -0.703 0.667 -2.419 0.950 52 
Regulation Quality (Estimate) -0.680 0.617 -2.497 0.623 52 
Voice and Accountability (Estimate) -0.640 0.706 -1.882 0.862 52 
Political Stability (Estimate) -0.523 0.914 -2.877 0.909 52 
Corruption Control (Estimate) -0.634 0.595 -2.227 0.967 52 
Government Effectiveness (Estimate) -0.680 0.609 -1.667 0.697 52 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum.  Max: Maximum.  Obser: Observations. CPI: Consumer Price Index. M2: Money Supply. GDP: 
Gross Domestic Product. But for the mobile penetration rates which source from the African Development Bank, the variables are gathered 
from African Development Indicators of the World Bank and the Financial Development and Structure Database (M2).  
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix  
GINI 
Index  
Mobile 
Penetration 
Control Variables Government Quality Instrumental Variables  
Inflation M2 Gov’t RL RQ V&A PolS CC GE  
1.000 -0.335 0.161 0.170 -0.003 0.115 -0.105 0.256 0.304 0.329 0.093 GINI 
 1.000 -0.031 -0.496 0.174 -0.367 -0.295 -0.259 -0.271 -0.387 -0.538 Mobile 
  1.000 -0.092 0.146 -0.258 -0.435 -0.184 -0.157 -0.201 -0.161 Inflation 
   1.000 -0.248 0.665 0.438 0.351 0.386 0.570 0.608 M2 
    1.000 0.014 0.044 0.022 0.131 0.025 -0.034 Gov’t 
     1.000 0.882 0.746 0.829 0.931 0.920 RL 
      1.000 0.708 0.681 0.840 0.881 RQ 
       1.000 0.669 0.753 0.697 V&A 
        1.000 0.764 0.684 PolS 
         1.000 0.907 CC 
          1.000 GE 
            
M2: Financial depth. Gov’: Government Expenditure.  RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulatory Quality. V&A: Voice  and Accountability. PolS: 
Political Stability. CC: Corruption-Control. GE: Government Effectiveness.  
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